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Reducing Food Stamp and Welfare
Caseloads in the South











As this volume attests, welfare reform is likely to have different ef-
fects in different areas of the country.  We consider how the distribution
of cash assistance and food stamps across urban and rural areas may af-
fect caseload change in the South.  Some trends suggest that rural areas
face more difficulty in reducing caseloads than urban areas; other
trends do not.  In this chapter, we provide a statistical test of rural/urban
differences in capacity to reduce caseloads.  Spatial effects are captured
by contrasting caseload trends over time in metropolitan (urban) coun-
ties and nonmetropolitan (rural) counties in two southern states, Mis-
sissippi and South Carolina.1
A rural/urban difference in rates of program participation might be
expected if barriers to moving off public assistance are more difficult
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to overcome in rural counties than in urban counties.2 Moreover, there
may be a link between the decline in welfare (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children [AFDC] or Temporary Assistance for Needy Fam-
ilies [TANF]) caseloads and the recent declines in the Food Stamp pro-
gram participation.  Zedlewski and Brauner (1999), for example,
found that those exiting welfare (beginning in 1995) leave the Food
Stamp program at higher rates than families that had not been on wel-
fare.
To test for location effects on caseload change, we use an empirical
model that controls for trends in the vitality of the local (county) econ-
omy, trends in the “opportunity costs” (e.g., minimum-wage earnings,
cash assistance, and the Earned Income Tax Credit) to the welfare re-
cipient of not entering the workforce, and changes in welfare policy in
each state.  Findings from these tests indicate that reducing both wel-
fare and food stamp participation rates will be more difficult in rural
counties than in urban counties in these southern states.
WHY METROPOLITAN/NONMETROPOLITAN 
CASELOAD ANALYSIS?
Urban and rural areas have very different kinds of economies.
Rural areas tend to have a larger share of jobs in “routine” manufactur-
ing, those further down the product life cycle.  Many rural areas are
dominated by a single industry, such as manufacturing, farming, or ex-
tractive industries, while urban economies offer jobs in a wide range of
trade and services sectors.  Because welfare caseloads can be affected
by both the vitality of the economy and the kinds of economic sectors
that are growing, diversified urban economies may have an advantage
over rural areas in reducing caseloads.3 In terms of work support ser-
vices, rural areas lack professional child care facilities and public tran-
sit for daily commuting.  Both services are much more likely to be
available in urban than in rural counties.  Each of these urban/rural dif-
ferences suggests that reducing caseloads in rural counties will be a
more difficult task than in urban counties, given the strength of the lo-
cal economy and the policy regime in effect.4
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Why Look at Caseload Changes?
We take a slightly different approach to studying welfare participa-
tion than the approaches in much of the previous research.  Modeling
caseloads, as we do here, instead of examining exit rates of welfare par-
ticipants (e.g., in leaver studies) has the advantage of capturing both en-
try and exit effects of changes in welfare policy (Moffitt 1999, pp.
96–97).  Looking only at the exit population says little about how po-
tential entrants respond to new policy, to the strength of the local econ-
omy, or to the opportunity cost of not entering the workforce.5
Because our goal is to test for urban/rural differences in caseloads
over time, ignoring how potential entrants affect caseload changes as-
sumes away much of the problem of understanding why caseloads in-
crease or decline.  A focus on total caseload change not only captures
how policy, the local economy, and opportunity costs affect potential
entrants, but also offers insight into related issues.  Figlio and Ziliak
(1999, p. 18), for example, note that if welfare caseloads are strongly
associated with the rate at which the economy is growing, state fiscal
problems may arise when the economy weakens.  When the economy
enters a recession, state TANF payments can be expected to rise
sharply.  States that have not set up a reserve fund from recent TANF
block grant funds will be faced with difficult choices on work assis-
tance program cutbacks and the need to raise new revenues.6
Why Within-State Caseload Analysis?
Most analyses of caseload change have used panel studies across
states and years.7 Caseload changes appear to be sensitive both to the
strength of the state economy and to the changing incentives embodied
in the welfare reforms in each state.  Using within-state analysis allows
us to capture the effect of local county labor market conditions on wel-
fare and food stamp participation decisions by households residing in
that county.  By tracking caseload changes in cash assistance programs
and the Food Stamp program over time and across counties within a
state, we also test for the effects of policy changes and for rural/urban
differences in caseload changes.  The welfare policy changes we exam-
ine include the adoption by South Carolina of the Family Independence
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Act of 1996, under the TANF umbrella.8 In Mississippi, several coun-
ties obtained waivers from AFDC rules in 1995, and TANF was insti-
tuted statewide in 1997.9 The Food Stamp program changes in 1997, as
mandated under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), reduced eligibility for some families
but mainly reduced benefit levels for all and required coordination with
TANF sanction rules (Zedlewski and Brauner 1999, pp. 4–8). 
RECENT TRENDS: MISSISSIPPI AND SOUTH CAROLINA10
Mississippi Caseloads
The number of welfare and food stamp cases (household units) has
declined dramatically since October of 1991 (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
In the pre-TANF period (October 1991 through September 1996), the
number of AFDC/TANF cases averaged 53,272 per month across all
counties.  This average caseload in the post-TANF period (October
1996 through April 1999) declined to 31,123 cases, a decline of 43.8
percent.  Although not as significant, average county food stamp case-
loads declined 25.1 percent in the post-TANF period (190,659 cases to
142,732 cases).  Caseload trends for three county groupings based on
degrees of ruralness (Ghelfi and Parker 1997) are constructed: metro-
politan counties (met); nonmetropolitan (rural) counties adjacent to
metropolitan counties (adj); and nonmetropolitan counties not adja-
cent to a metropolitan county (nonadj).  In Figures 4.1 and 4.2,
AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseload trends are compared with
monthly unemployment rates for each spatial grouping.
Welfare
Since the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1992 on October 1, 1991,
the number of AFDC/TANF cases (households) has declined steadily
for all three groups of counties, metropolitan, rural adjacent, and rural
nonadjacent (Figure 4.1).  Only in metropolitan counties was there a
slight increase in cases from October 1991 through roughly mid July
1993.  Over the remainder of the time, cases have steadily dropped in
all three county classifications.  Comparing average monthly caseloads
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Figure 4.1  Mississippi AFDC/TANF Caseloads and Unemployment
Rates, 1991–99 
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Figure 4.2  Mississippi Food Stamp Caseloads and Unemployment Rates,
1991–99 
Chapter 4 119
in the pre- and post-TANF periods indicates that MET counties experi-
enced a decline of 51.6 percent in caseloads (from 13,589 to 6,573),
while ADJ caseloads fell by 43.5 percent (from 9,361 to 5,291), and NON-
ADJ county caseloads fell by 40.6 percent (from 32,422 to 19,259).
Unemployment rates have also declined somewhat over the time
period, reflecting the overall robustness of the state and national econo-
mies (Figure 4.1).  However, there does not appear to be any clear cor-
relation between welfare caseload changes and unemployment rates be-
yond the fact that both have fallen over time.  Also, there are no sharp
differences across the three county groupings in welfare cases and un-
employment trends.
The rural/urban share of caseload numbers has changed somewhat
over the 1990s.  The rural share of total state caseloads increased from
59 percent to 62 percent, the rural adjacent county share remained es-
sentially unchanged, and the metropolitan share dropped by almost 4
percent.  These figures may reflect the barriers in rural areas to success-
ful welfare-to-work transitions reported by Beeler et al. (1999).11
Food stamps
As with welfare caseloads, food stamp caseloads have been declin-
ing, but at a significantly lower rate (Figure 4.2).12 Food stamp trends
reveal little correlation to fluctuations in unemployment rates.  Mean
monthly food stamp declines from the pre- to post-TANF periods were
roughly half as great as those for welfare cases: 28 percent for metro-
politan; 27 percent for rural adjacent; and 23 percent for rural nonadja-
cent areas.  In contrast to welfare cases, where the rural share of total
cases increased after welfare reform, food stamp shares of the total
caseload by county groups remained essentially unchanged.
South Carolina Caseloads
Welfare
The number of welfare caseloads in South Carolina (household
units) also declined steadily after the implementation of the Family In-
dependence Act (FIA) in October 1996 (Figure 4.3). The monthly av-
erage caseloads across all counties in South Carolina declined from
47,610 in the pre-TANF period (January 1990 through September
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Figure 4.3  South Carolina AFDC/TANF Caseloads and Unemployment
Rates, 1990–99 
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1996) to 32,566 during the post-TANF period (October 1996 through
August 1998), a decline of 31.6 percent.  The monthly caseload trend in
metropolitan counties shows a sharp decline (29.1 percent) in the post-
TANF period after October 1, 1996.  The caseload declined from an av-
erage caseload of 27,280 in the pre-TANF period to 19,344 after TANF.
Similar downturns are evident in rural counties adjacent to metropoli-
tan counties and nonadjacent rural counties; each area experienced av-
erage caseload declines of about 35 percent from the pre- to post-TANF
period averages.13
In South Carolina, metropolitan counties have the highest welfare
caseloads, while in Mississippi, rural counties have the most welfare
cases.  Moreover, unlike in Mississippi, the trends in Figure 4.3 also
suggest that the robustness of the local economies is correlated with
changes in caseloads since the FIA was implemented.  In each county
group, the mean unemployment rate has declined since October 1996.14
Although unemployment rates have been lower in metropolitan coun-
ties than in rural counties, the rates have fallen sharply across all coun-
ty types since late 1996.  Figure 4.3 suggests that strength in the local
economy (lower unemployment rates) is associated with reduced wel-
fare caseloads.  When unemployment rates rise, welfare cases increase
(as they did in the early 1990s).  This local economy effect on caseloads
seems to have been in play both before and after the state’s TANF plan
was implemented in October 1996.  After 1996, the rural share of cases
fell from 43 percent to 41 percent while the metropolitan share in-
creased from 57 percent to 59 percent. 
Food stamps
In contrast to the dramatic declines in welfare caseloads since
1993, South Carolina food stamp caseloads have remained stable even
as unemployment rates dipped in the mid 1990s. There is also no ap-
parent reduction in caseloads after the FIA—especially in the rural
counties (Figure 4.4). The number of food stamp caseloads is three to
four times the number of cash assistance cases, suggesting an ongoing
need for this form of support even as welfare caseloads have plunged
over the 1990s.
In metropolitan counties, the number of food stamp caseloads in
the 1990s fluctuated around 80,000 households each month.  The trends
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Figure 4.4  South Carolina Food Stamp Caseloads and Unemployment
Rates, 1990–99 
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in Figure 4.4 suggest that food stamp caseloads vary with the unem-
ployment rate in metropolitan counties—with perhaps the beginning of
a downward trend appearing in 1997.  In rural adjacent counties, about
50,000 households received food stamps in the 1990s.  The number of
caseloads did not deviate much from this level throughout the decade.
Even more apparent is the lack of correlation between changes in the
rural nonadjacent unemployment rate and the number of food stamp
cases.  In these rural counties, food stamp caseloads hovered around
10,000 even as the unemployment rate dropped from over 8 percent to
about 4 percent. 
The mean number of metropolitan county food stamp caseloads de-
clined by about 3 percent from the pre-FIA to the post-FIA period.  In
rural counties, the decline was about 1 percent.  These results differ
sharply from the 31.6 percent decline seen in the cash assistance cases
after the FIA was implemented.  Because the FIA does not end food
stamp eligibility and many of the jobs taken by former FIA clients are
in entry-level, service-sector jobs, it is not surprising that many former
welfare clients draw on food stamps to help cover the basic costs of liv-
ing.15 It appears that rural households may have a more long-term need
for food stamp assistance than households in metropolitan counties.
This may be due to a more attractive mix of job opportunities (and
earnings potential) in metropolitan counties than in rural counties.  Or,
it may reflect differing demographic characteristics of urban and rural
low-wage households that suggest more persistent need for food stamp
assistance in rural areas. 
A key finding in the pre- and post-FIA caseloads by county type is
that rural counties in South Carolina do not seem to be at a disadvan-
tage in reducing caseloads.  The state share of caseloads in rural coun-
ties is smaller after the FIA than before.  However, population and the
associated resident labor force may also be growing faster in metro
counties than in rural counties.  If so, the caseloads per capita may be
increasing in rural areas relative to urban areas.  A summary of surveys
of former FIA clients presented in Reinschmiedt et al. (1999) indicated
that inadequate public transportation and child care continue to be bar-
riers to reducing welfare caseloads in Mississippi.  However, without a
rural-urban distinction in the South Carolina leaver surveys, it is un-
clear whether these barriers are worse in rural or urban counties.
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CASELOAD CHANGES: TESTS FOR A
“RURAL DISADVANTAGE”
Some caseload trends in Mississippi and South Carolina suggest
that there are more severe barriers to moving off public assistance and
more need for food assistance in rural counties relative to urban coun-
ties; other trends do not.  We examine the “rural disadvantage” hypoth-
esis using econometric models of caseload change along the lines of
those developed by the Council of Economic Advisers (1999).16 The
formal model is presented in the appendix.
The dependent variable in this model is the caseload participa-
tion rate—the number of caseloads in a county divided by the county
labor force.17 Because a county with a larger population (and labor
force) will have more caseloads than less densely populated counties, a
proper test for rural-urban differences must control for the size of the
county labor force (or population).  Using caseload participation rates
achieves this control.
To explain why caseload participation rates may have changed over
time, three groups of “explanatory variables” are used in the regression
model.  These include opportunity cost variables, TANF and the econo-
my variables, and region identifiers to test for rural/urban differences in
caseload participation rates, holding other factors constant.   
“Opportunity Cost” Variables18
The first opportunity cost variable, the value of the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), has been assigned an important role in reducing
caseloads by Ellwood (2000).  Its value changed substantially over the
1990s, giving more incentives to welfare recipients to join the work-
force.  These changes are proxied by the average maximum EITC for
taxpayers with children for each year, 1990–1999.  As the value of the
EITC increases, caseloads should decline because the earned income
forgone by remaining on welfare increases.
The second opportunity cost variable is the monthly value of state
minimum wage divided by the maximum monthly AFDC/TANF cash
assistance benefit for a family of three.  Because many former welfare
clients begin work in the low-wage segment of the labor market,
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changes in the minimum wage serve as a good proxy for the expected
wage income for former welfare participants who enter the labor mar-
ket.  By comparing this expected wage income from working to the
cash assistance forgone by leaving welfare, welfare recipients can esti-
mate the expected net income benefits from voluntarily leaving
AFDC/TANF.  
TANF and the Economy Variables19
Several welfare policy variables are constructed to test for the ef-
fect that TANF reforms have had on changes in caseloads, holding con-
stant opportunity costs, the strength of the county economy and urban-
rural location of the welfare recipients.  Tests of the effect of the TANF
reforms at the county level in the two states are made using three vari-
ables.  First, a simple test for a discrete change in caseloads before and
after TANF is made.  This discrete effect—independent of the strength
of the local economy—might arise from aspects of the TANF reforms
that reflect new sanction rules, time limits, and efficiencies or “cultu-
ral” reforms in how the local welfare agencies provide services to wel-
fare clients under TANF versus AFDC.  
A second welfare policy variable tests the proposition that TANF
reforms are likely to reduce caseloads only in conjunction with a robust
county economy that provides job opportunities to former welfare
clients.  Simply put, welfare reform may provide a host of incentives to
exit welfare but if no jobs are available, one would not expect the case-
loads to decline.  To test this hypothesis, we create two interaction vari-
ables.  If the TANF reforms reduce caseloads mainly when the unem-
ployment rate is falling, then the interaction variable will have a
positive parameter (increasing the expected positive parameter value
for the unemployment rate variable in the TANF period compared to
the AFDC period).
The role of the local economy in caseload change is also captured
in a second variable, the employment growth rate for the county.  Em-
ployment growth is a good indicator of how well the local economy is
generating new jobs for welfare leavers and those who might be new
entrants to the welfare program.  In contrast, the unemployment rate re-
flects household decisions on labor force participation and underlying
population change as well as local job generation.  Faster local job
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growth should reduce welfare caseloads; a negative parameter is ex-
pected for the employment growth variable.  As before, if TANF re-
forms are most effective when jobs are more plentiful, then the interac-
tion effect between local employment growth rates and TANF should
be significant, and the parameter estimate should be negative.  Faster
job growth is expected to reduce welfare caseloads and caseloads are
expected to decline faster in the post-TANF period under this scenario.
Regions Used to Test for Rural/Urban 
Differences in Caseload Change
We estimate several regression models to reflect alternative ways to
define “rurality” using alternative dummy variables representing loca-
tion effects.  In the first regression, a simple indicator variable identifies
counties as either metropolitan or nonmetropolitan.  The second re-
gression tests for a “remote” rural disadvantage by dividing the non-
metropolitan counties into a group adjacent to metro counties and non-
metropolitan counties not adjacent to metropolitan counties.  Welfare
participants in counties more distant from urban job centers may have
less access to jobs than welfare participants in counties near urban
counties.
A third regression divides the nonmetro counties into one of four
economic base groups: farm, manufacturing, government, or other, the
last including services and nonspecialized (Ghelfi and Parker 1997).
Positive parameters on these dummy variables would indicate that
counties in these classes are less likely to reduce welfare participation
rates than are urban counties, given the same vitality of the local econ-
omy, opportunity cost of not working, and policy regime.  This is a way
to control for “industry mix” effects on welfare participation that Bartik
and Eberts (1999) found to be useful in explaining changes in welfare
caseloads. 
In addition, each state was divided into functional economic re-
gions (economic areas developed in Johnson 1995).  These regions
have an urban center and rural hinterland that are connected by sub-
stantial within-region commuting.  Regions with a booming urban cen-
ter that offers jobs to residents in proximate rural areas are expected to
have more success in reducing rural caseloads than other regions.  In-
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cluding economic area region variables also provides control for the
type of urban center: government-dominated urban areas such as Co-
lumbia, South Carolina, and Jackson, Mississippi; manufacturing-dom-
inated regions such as the Greenville-Spartanburg metro center along
the I-85 growth corridor from Charlotte to Atlanta; and resort-tourism
service oriented urban areas such as Charleston, South Carolina, and
the Mississippi Gulf Coast. 
Food stamps model
The food stamps model is similar to the welfare caseload model
used by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) for two reasons.
First, across most states, there has been a strong correlation between
food stamps and AFDC/TANF caseload changes.  Second, important
changes in food stamp policy took effect in 1997 (Zedlewski and
Brauner 1999).  Following a suggestion in Wallace and Blank (1999),
we use AFDC/TANF caseloads per capita as a variable in explaining
food stamp caseloads in one model, recognizing that this raises endo-
geneity problems.
However, unlike the CEA model that is estimated among states, the
level of nominal cash assistance benefits is approximately constant
among counties in South Carolina and Mississippi—about $200 per
month.  Thus, we cannot test for the effects of varying benefits levels
among counties as the CEA does among states.  Instead, the ratio of the
minimum wage monthly equivalent to the benefit level was used as one
proxy for the changing opportunity cost to welfare caseloads to staying
on AFDC/TANF.  
RESULTS
The key findings from estimating the regression equations are sum-
marized in Table 4.1 for both AFDC/TANF and food stamps.  The
county welfare caseload participation rate (county caseloads divided by
county labor force) is the dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 of the
table, while the county food stamp caseload participation rate is the de-
pendent variable for columns 3 and 4.
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Table 4.1  Determinants of Welfare and Food Stamp Caseloads in South
Carolina and Mississippi, 1990–99
Direction of influence on
AFDC/TANF Food stamps
Explanatory variables S.C. Miss. S.C. Miss.
Opportunity cost
Ratio of minimum wage to benefits – – – –
Value of the Earned Income Tax Credit – – – –
TANF and the economy
TANF (welfare reform alone) ns ns ns –
TANF × employment growth – – – –
Employment growth (lagged) mixed – mixed –
TANF × unemployment rates + +
Unemployment rates (lagged) + +
Region
1) Rural + + + +
2) Rural – adjacent + + + +
Rural – not adjacent + + + +
3) Rural – farm + + + +
Rural – manufacturing + ns + +
Rural – government ns ns ns +
Rural – other + + + +
4) “Persistent poverty” in S.C. + +
“Delta” in Miss. + ns
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln(caseloads/labor force).  Nonsignificant regression pa-
rameter at the 0.05 level is denoted “ns.”  Regression parameters significant at least
at the 0.05 level are denoted “+” for a positive relationship between increasing the
value of the explanatory variable and increasing caseloads (for details, see Henry et
al. 2000).  Variables that have some positive and some negative effects are indicated
as “mixed.”  Blank cells indicate that the variable was not used in the regression.
“Region” effects are comparisons between the rural category and the metropolitan
counties in the state.
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Opportunity Costs, Policy Reforms, and the Economy: How Did
They Affect Welfare Caseloads in Mississippi and South Carolina?
The effect on AFDC/TANF caseloads from the “opportunity costs”
and “TANF and the economy” variables are reported in data columns 1
and 2 of the first two sections of Table 4.1.  For the two “opportunity
cost” variables—increases in the minimum wage relative to AFDC/
TANF benefits and a higher EITC, increasing the EITC and the mini-
mum wage relative to cash assistance reduces welfare participation as
expected. These results are statistically significant across all models es-
timated for South Carolina and Mississippi.20
A second consistent finding is that TANF policy impacts on case-
loads occur in conjunction with a strong local economy.  Although the
TANF indicator variable is not significantly different from zero21 in ei-
ther state, the interaction of TANF with the local economic variables
was important in explaining caseload.  This suggests that TANF incen-
tives to leave welfare (or not join the welfare program) are effective if
the local economy is generating local job opportunities.  This finding is
consistent with Ellwood (2000), who argued the TANF effect may be
strongest where a robust local economy offers more low-wage jobs to
former welfare clients. 
In South Carolina, lower unemployment rates reduce caseloads, and
the effect of lower unemployment rates on caseloads is about twice as
strong after TANF than before.  Employment growth rate effects are
more mixed for South Carolina.  Prior research (e.g., Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers 1999) indicates that employment growth affects welfare
participation decisions but that there is a lag between the labor market
signal and caseload changes.  In South Carolina and Mississippi, faster
employment growth reduces caseloads as expected, but there is about a
three-month lag between a stronger local economy and caseload de-
clines.  Although faster job growth reduces welfare caseloads, the job
growth impact of caseloads has been stronger since TANF.  However,
the employment growth effects are more mixed than those for the unem-
ployment rate.  The four-quarter lag in employment growth has a posi-
tive effect on caseloads.  This suggests in-migration to fast-growing
counties by low-wage households that are seeking jobs but still drawing
welfare benefits for a period.  During the post-TANF period, however,
the four-quarter lagged employment growth turns negative or neutral.  
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The Mississippi findings for local economic and policy effects on
caseloads are similar to those for South Carolina.  In Mississippi, the
one-quarter and four-quarter lagged job growth effects were negative,
as expected.  The one-quarter lag interaction with TANF also con-
tributed to strong declines in welfare caseloads, while the four-quarter
lag interaction effect was neutral. The Mississippi results also indicate
that both a strong economy and the implementation of welfare reform
have contributed to declines in welfare participation rates. 
Is There a Rural Disadvantage in Reducing Welfare Caseloads?
Findings indicate a strong metropolitan advantage in reducing the
rate of welfare participation rates in both South Carolina and Mississip-
pi, other things being equal, as shown in data columns 1 and 2 of the
“Region” section of Table 4.1.  Welfare caseload participation rates are
higher in nonmetro counties than metro counties after controlling for
local economic vitality, TANF policy effects, and the rising opportuni-
ty cost of staying on welfare.  The results suggest a slightly higher dis-
advantage in the more remote South Carolina and Mississippi rural
counties (those not adjacent to a metro county).  
Spatially configuring counties according to predominant economic
activity produced mixed results for the two states.  Farm-based econo-
mies in both South Carolina and Mississippi had higher rates of welfare
participation relative to other counties.  Beyond this common element,
other economy types showed varying differences from the metro base.
In South Carolina, where most rural counties are manufacturing or ser-
vice or mixed economies, there was little difference from the nonmetro
average effect.  The lower salary, predominantly service-mixed rural
economies in Mississippi had greater numbers of welfare cases than
metro counties.  
Economic region effects are also associated with welfare participa-
tion in both states.  In South Carolina, the reference region is the I-85
growth corridor in the northwest corner of the state.  It is dominated by
a diverse manufacturing sector, with BMW, Hitachi, and Michelin pro-
viding a high profile for international investors, and the region has a
rapidly expanding service sector serving a growing population.  Other
regions, with the exception perhaps of the Charlotte (North Carolina)
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spillover region, are likely to have higher rates of welfare participation
than the I-85 growth corridor.  The Midlands and Low Country regions
include many of the persistent poverty counties in South Carolina and
are part of the set of counties with persistent poverty that run across the
Southeast.  It appears that rural counties in these economic regions will
have the most difficult time reducing welfare caseloads. 
In Mississippi, the Jackson-based metro region and surrounding
area was used as a reference.  Three regions differed significantly from
the base.  Two regions had lower levels of welfare participation—a cor-
ridor of development activity paralleling an interstate highway from
Jackson to Meridian; and an area in which the economy has undergone
rapid growth in light industry, particularly upholstered furniture manu-
facturing.  A third region differing significantly from the metro base
was the high-poverty region of the Mississippi Delta, which had no-
tably higher numbers of welfare cases.22 This region depends heavily
on production agriculture and is plagued by limited employment oppor-
tunities and the full range of socioeconomic problems accompanying
persistent poverty across the Black Belt region of the South.  
Several general conclusions can be inferred from the Mississippi
and South Carolina cash assistance findings.  One is that a strong econ-
omy, represented here by variables measuring unemployment rates and
employment growth rates, has contributed significantly to the caseload
declines observed from 1991–1999.  Second, TANF program changes
have not significantly affected caseloads, holding other things constant,
unless accompanied by strong local economies.  As noted, the relative-
ly short time elapsed since the passage and implementation of the
PRWORA may be a factor in this finding.  Over time and as economic
conditions change, these program initiatives may have a more signifi-
cant impact. 
Finally, this research shows that spatial issues are important to un-
derstanding caseload changes.  Specifically, the results show that the
caseload participation rates are significantly higher in nonmetropolitan
areas, all else the same, and farm-dependent areas face the most diffi-
cult challenges in reducing caseloads.  This finding suggests that rural
areas may experience unique problems and face additional obstacles in
the implementation of PRWORA not encountered in more urbanized
areas.  
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Food Stamp Participation in South Carolina and Mississippi
Results for food stamp participation in South Carolina and Mis-
sissippi are presented in data columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.1.  They
differ somewhat from the cash assistance results.  This is not surpris-
ing given the smaller changes in food stamp caseloads compared with
the dramatic reductions in AFDC/TANF over the period under re-
view.23 We find that higher minimum wages and increases in the EITC
in both states tend to lower total food stamp participation.  However,
when looking at those only receiving food stamps without cash as-
sistance (the residual cases), the relationships reverse in South Caro-
lina.  A possible reason for the reversal is that residual cases view 
the higher minimum wage and higher EITC benefits and food stamps
as a “work support package.”  As the minimum wage and EITC in-
creased, fewer people entered welfare but more signed on for food
stamps.  
Focusing on the South Carolina “residual” food stamp cases,
TANF, by itself, has a negative, but insignificant, impact on food
stamp caseloads and seems to have only a weak effect during quarters
when employment is growing.  Faster employment growth lagged four
quarters seems to increase the food stamp caseloads.  This suggests
that there is in-migration to high employment growth counties, with
added demand for food stamps at least for a time.  Employment
growth in the most recent quarter reduces food stamp caseloads.  It
may be that not enough time has passed between this quarterly signal
of job growth in a county and subsequent immigration of food stamp
participants.  
In Mississippi, relative to the welfare caseload results, the effects
on food stamp caseloads were considerably smaller. This is expected
given the eligibility link between food stamp benefits and income as
well as other eligibility requirements.  That is, as income levels in-
crease, individuals can remain eligible for some level of benefits as
long as they remain below the 130 percent poverty level and meet oth-
er necessary requirements.  
Differing from South Carolina, the effect of TANF implementation
is highly significant and negative in all the Mississippi food stamp
models, indicating that program changes have contributed to declining
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food stamp participation.  This finding, although not necessarily antici-
pated, is not surprising for two reasons.  First, addressing food stamp
and TANF interrelationships, Zedlewski and Brauner (1999) found that
about one-third of families leaving food stamps were no longer eligible
based on their current income, meaning that almost two-thirds were
leaving for some reason other than income thresholds.  They found that
former welfare recipients left the Food Stamp program more often than
their non-welfare counterparts regardless of income level.  Roughly 84
percent of those receiving TANF in Mississippi also received food
stamps over the time period evaluated.  Second, although not likely as
important to Mississippi as to border states such as Texas and Califor-
nia, the denial of food stamps to immigrants beginning in 1997 was a
major policy change that nearly coincides with implementation of
TANF. 
The impact of employment growth lagged one- and four-quarters
on food stamps paralleled the findings for welfare caseloads.  Again,
the fourth-quarter lag was not significant.  Unemployment lagged 12
months and the lagged unemployment–TANF interaction terms were
both highly significant and both had positive signs, indicating that low-
er unemployment rates reduce food stamp caseloads.  Although highly
significant, the post-TANF program unemployment effect is consider-
ably weaker in the post-TANF timeframe.
Is There a Rural Disadvantage in Reducing 
Food Stamp Caseloads?
Except for the case of the lone government-dependent county in
South Carolina, all rural counties in both states, regardless of location
or economic base, fare worse than metropolitan counties in reducing
the rate of food stamp participation.  Mirroring the South Carolina wel-
fare caseload results, counties in the economic regions outside the I-85
manufacturing belt depend more on the Food Stamp program to sup-
plement incomes of the working poor.  Economic regions in Mississip-
pi also showed results similar to the welfare caseload analyses.  Farm-
based counties had higher food stamp participation rates, although the
Delta region showed no significant difference in food stamp participa-
tion rates relative to the urban reference.  
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SUMMARY
Evidence presented here suggests that, for these two southern
states, rural areas will have more difficulty than urban areas in reducing
both cash assistance and Food Stamp program participation, all else the
same.  In Mississippi, rural counties with a strong orientation toward
farming and those in the Delta region are likely to face the greatest dif-
ficulty in reducing cash assistance caseloads.  Farm-based rural coun-
ties in Mississippi face the most difficulty in reducing food stamp par-
ticipation rates.  In South Carolina, it is the set of rural counties that lie
between Columbia and the coast that are least likely to reduce depen-
dence on welfare and food stamps. 
Why the rural disadvantage exists is an open question.  It may
mean that improved rural transit linking rural residents to urban em-
ployment growth areas is needed to reduce rural caseloads.  More wide-
ly available child care, job training, and other assistance in rural areas
may be needed.  Because rural clients tend to be dispersed, rural efforts
to reduce barriers to leaving welfare are likely to be more expensive on
a case-by-case basis than in urban centers.
One important qualifier to the evidence presented in this chapter is
worth emphasizing.  Unlike other areas in the country, South Carolina
and Mississippi have few, if any, metropolitan areas with urban core
counties that have a concentration of poverty and TANF dependence.
Given the evidence in Smith and Woodbury (1999) that urban core
cities do worse than suburbs or nonurban areas in providing jobs for
low-wage labor, a test for caseload change between rural and the urban
core would be useful but best undertaken in states that have larger met-
ropolitan areas.  
Finally, most of the employment growth in both Mississippi and
South Carolina has been concentrated in urban counties and rural coun-
ties along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.  The most remote rural counties
have not benefited as much from state economic growth, suggesting
that both economic development programs and “barrier” programs to
provide transit, child care, and job training are needed to reduce the rate
of welfare participation in rural Mississippi and South Carolina.  As
caseloads rise in the next recession, under the TANF rules, states will
have three choices: “cut people off even though jobs may not be avail-
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able, relax the time limits, or provide some form of subsidized work for
those that cannot get private employment” (Ellwood 2000, p. 193).
States like South Carolina and Mississippi, with pockets of rural pover-
ty, may be under substantial fiscal stress when they are faced with ris-
ing needs to support low-income households during a time when state
revenues are not growing and the TANF block grant is fixed.
Notes
1. Analysis within a state has several advantages over cross-state analyses.  The
low-wage labor market conditions that welfare recipients confront are more
closely reflected in local county data than state averages.  Second, the institution-
al framework—political, social, and economic—is likely to be more consistent
among counties in a given state than among 50 states.
2. Henry, Barkley, and Brooks (1996) examined a South Carolina case study illus-
trating the rural spatial mismatch between where new entry-level jobs are grow-
ing and where low-income households are located.  Alternatively, Smith and
Woodbury (1999) found that low-wage job growth may be favorable to the em-
ployment prospects of former welfare recipients in nonurban areas; urban suburbs
are likely to fare best, and central cities the worst in offering low-wage job oppor-
tunities.
3. Bartik and Eberts (1999, p. 139) found that three state “industrial mix” variables
are important to understanding caseload changes among states.
4. Possible differences in caseload change across multicounty regions, each with an
urban core and rural hinterland, are also explored in this chapter.
5. Moffitt and Ver Ploeg (1999) provided an overview of data and methodological
issues for evaluating welfare reform and a review of selected state and local eval-
uation projects.
6. These choices are explored in Pavetti (1999).
7. Bartik and Eberts (1999) is an exception as metropolitan areas are considered in
one set of models.  In addition, Wallace and Blank (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak
(1999) estimated models with monthly data at the state level.
8. Given new federal flexibility in administering state AFDC in the mid 1990s,
South Carolina began to transform its AFDC program in January 1996 (prior to
the passage of the federal PRWORA) with new training and education programs
for adult AFDC recipients.  Anticipating the PRWORA, South Carolina had trans-
formed AFDC into its version of TANF, the Family Independence (FI) program,
by October 1996.  Three key features of the FI program distinguish it from
AFDC:  1) Individuals are required to seek work before becoming eligible for the
FI program, whereas income criteria were sufficient under AFDC; 2) A time limit
of 2 years within a 10-year span, with a total lifetime limit of 5 years; and 3) un-
der FI, failure of an adult client to comply with FI requirements can result in both
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the adult recipient and the entire family losing benefits.  Although this is a more
severe noncompliance feature compared with AFDC, the FI program also allows
spouses to participate in FI just as in the more stringent AFDC Unemployed Par-
ent eligibility provision.
9. The process of welfare reform in Mississippi began in 1993 with the passage of
legislation to implement statewide changes and demonstration projects to address
the needs of the state’s low-wage population through increased work opportuni-
ties, supportive services for adults, and required school attendance and health care
for children.  This legislation, the Mississippi Welfare Restructuring Program Act
of 1993, was amended in the 1994 legislative session, allowing the state to re-
quest waivers, later granted by HHS, HCFA, and USDA, to implement the
amended reforms.  In December 1994, Mississippi began its pilot Welfare Reform
Demonstration Project along with the work program component, WorkFirst, in
six counties.  The pilot program made benefits contingent on fulfilling a work re-
quirement and was virtually identical to the federal TANF legislation in 1996.
Development of the existing state plan for TANF implementation began with the
approval of an initial state plan to take advantage of TANF block grant funds
available beginning October 1, 1996.  The Mississippi legislature passed and the
governor signed House Bill 766 in March 1997, authorizing the Mississippi De-
partment of Human Services (MDHS) to implement the TANF Work Program
(TWP) and other reforms throughout the state.  TWP replaces the old Job Oppor-
tunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) program and focuses on the immediate placement
of nonexempt TANF recipients in private-sector, full-time jobs.  Key features dif-
ferentiating TWP from JOBS are:  TWP focuses on immediate job placement,
whereas the JOBS program focused on long-term preparation for work; TWP has
a full family TANF sanction for noncompliance that existed with the JOBS pro-
gram.  TWP has a 5-year lifetime limit on the receipt of benefits and provides a
160-hour job search program, including a 20-hour job readiness-training program
for adult TANF recipients.
10. This section draws from Reinschmiedt et al. (1999).
11. Key findings in this leaver study are summarized in Reinschmiedt et al. (1999).
12. The spike that occurred in all three groupings in October 1998 resulted from 
a special disaster one-month issuance of food stamps associated with a hurri-
cane.
13. South Carolina has 16 MSA counties, 24 rural adjacent counties, and 6 nonadja-
cent rural counties.
14. Unemployment rates are the weighted means for each county type.
15. However, Zedlewski and Brauner (1999) found that former welfare clients exited
the FSP at a greater rate than those not receiving AFDC/TANF in 1995–1997.
16. Rector and Youssef (1999, p. 1) found that states with “stringent sanctions and
immediate work requirements . . . are highly associated with rapid rates of case-
load decline,” while “the relative vigor of state economies, as measured by unem-
ployment rates, has no statistically significant effect on caseload decline.”  How-
ever, this is a distinctly minority finding.  Most analysts find that robust economic
growth is important to reducing welfare caseloads.  The Council of Economic Ad-
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visers (1999), Figlio and Ziliak (1999), Wallace and Blank (1999), Bartik and
Eberts (1999), and Moffitt (1999) each found that stronger state economies have
the expected effect of reducing participation in welfare programs.  Bartik and
Eberts (1999) found that use of the unemployment rate alone as an indicator of
the robustness of the local (state) economy failed to explain recent dramatic
declines in caseloads or late 1980s increases in caseloads despite low unemploy-
ment rates.  They concluded that other features of the local labor market—em-
ployment growth rates and some industry mix variables—also need to be includ-
ed in the measurement of the robustness of the local economy.  They resolve the
riddle of rising caseloads in the late 1980s in the face of lower unemployment
rates by noting the decrease in demand for low-skill labor during the same period.
The rapid decline in caseloads in the late 1990s is most likely explained by new
TANF policy given that indicators of local labor demand fail to explain the de-
cline.  Rector and Youssef (1999) provided support for this view for the January
1997 to June 1998 period.  Specifically, they assert that an increase in the severi-
ty of penalties for noncompliance with TANF regulations across states has been a
major force in reducing welfare caseloads in the late 1990s.  Recent Council of
Economic Advisors (1999) results also support an important policy impact from
TANF.
17. County labor force and monthly estimates of population were used as alternative
bases for calculating the caseload participation rates.  There is virtually no differ-
ence in the empirical estimates using the two divisors.
18. Ellwood (2000) made several observations about how means-tested benefits in
the welfare system (AFDC/TANF and food stamps) and income support pro-
grams for working, low-wage households, especially the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), have changed since the early 1990s to provide powerful incentives
to leave welfare.  First, the real value of welfare benefits in the median state is
now about half the 1970 level.  Second, the EITC benefits expanded dramatically
in the early 1990s.  Third, there is expanded support for child care and Medicaid
coverage for children of a single parent working full-time at the minimum wage.
In one comparison, a single parent working full-time at the minimum wage in
1986 would gain total real “disposable” income of $2,005 in 1996 dollars—about
a 24 percent gain over AFDC and lose all Medicaid coverage by leaving AFDC.
By 1997, the same parent would gain real disposable income of $7,129 and lose
Medicaid coverage for adults only by leaving TANF for a full time minimum
wage job.  This gain roughly doubles the disposable income of the working parent
in 1997 in the median state.  Chernik and McGuire (1999, pp. 278–280) also ar-
gued that the EITC has substantially increased the benefits of moving from no
work to at least part-time work.  The percentage gain in real disposable income
when a welfare recipient moves from welfare to work is likely to be even larger in
most southern states given their low levels of TANF benefits compared with the
rest of the nation.  As the minimum wage is increased and cash assistance from a
state’s TANF program declines in real terms, there will be further increases in the
cost to the welfare recipient of staying on welfare.  This “pull” effect is apparent
before considering how “push” incentives from new sanction rules for noncom-
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pliance with TANF rules or time limits might affect the household decision to
leave welfare.  This is also before any consideration of caseload impacts from the
demand side of the labor market for low-wage households—the strength of the lo-
cal economy—or the variation in availability of work support services (public
transit, child care, and job training) across localities.
19. Studies find that welfare policy reform has contributed to the reduction in case-
loads, although the business cycle caseload effect has been stronger over the peri-
ods studied than the impact of welfare policy reform.  In part, the relatively weak
policy effect may be associated with the short time period over which the new
policies have been in place.  Although waivers from AFDC were implemented by
some states in the early 1990s, in most states TANF was “activated” in October
1996, leaving only two complete years of data on how TANF recipients have re-
sponded to the new rules and incentives.  The two-consecutive-years-on TANF
rule would, in most states, not have been binding on most recipients until late
1998 at the earliest.  Indeed, the Council of Economic Advisors (1999) report was
a follow-up to the earlier Wallace and Blank (1999) analysis to address this time
series issue.  The most recent CEA study found that the welfare policy impacts ac-
counted for about one-third of the caseload decline from 1996–1998.
20. Complete regression results are available from Henry et al. (2000).
21. The associated p values are in the 0.2 or above range.  Tables with detailed statis-
tical properties are available on request.
22. Howell, in this volume, also examines caseload data in Mississippi, with out-
wardly different results.  However, Howell makes the point that the single labor
market area (LMA) with the most TANF recipients is Jackson.  He also shows,
however, that the Delta region (which includes more than one LMA) does indeed
have more TANF cases than the Jackson LMA.  In addition, and more important,
Howell compares actual caseloads, while the findings in this chapter (Henry) are
based on a regression analysis in which other factors that might differ between the
regions is held constant.  Therefore, holding all else constant between the regions,
the caseload would be predicted to be higher in the Delta than the Jackson LMA.
23. The lagged unemployment and its interaction with TANF are deleted to allow use
of the random effects approach in the food stamps models displayed in columns 3
and 4 of Table 1.
24. Data for the CEA study are annual calendar years from 1976–1998 on all states
and the District of Columbia for 1,173 observations (Council of Economic Advis-
ers 1999, pp. 10–13).
25. The models estimated for South Carolina and Mississippi differ from the CEA
model in variables, data used, and in estimation strategy.  First, counties and
months are used as the panel (rather than states and years).  Because it is the
strength of the local county economy (rather than the state average) that would
seem most relevant in welfare clients’ job searches, the use of county data seems
proper.  The CEA study uses the number of caseloads in a case divided by state
population on an annual basis.  However, the SC-MS data are across counties and
months so there is no population estimate available to us as a denominator in the
rate calculation.  Accordingly, the county labor force by month is used as a proxy
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for the size of the local population, and the dependent variable is the log of case-
loads/labor force.  Although the size of this is a practical necessity given that
county population data by month are not available, county working-age popula-
tion and labor force are likely to be highly correlated.  Second, the South Caroli-
na–Mississippi model uses both unemployment rates and employment growth
rates as suggested by Bartik and Eberts (1999) to capture the vitality of the coun-
ty economy in offering work to welfare clients.  Interaction effects of the unem-
ployment rate and the employment growth rates with TANF are used to determine
whether the policy effects from TANF are influenced by the economic conditions
facing welfare recipients.  Third, opportunity costs of not working are proxied
both by the ratio of the minimum wage to welfare benefits and by changes in the
Earned Income Tax Credit.  Fourth, there are several tests, using the “region”
variables, for the effects of a rural location on welfare and food stamp participa-
tion rates.  With metropolitan counties as the reference group, region effects are
reflected across several alternative dimensions within each state.
26. The CEA model uses a county-specific time trend variable to control for “unob-
served factors, such as family structure and other policies that may be correlated
with the observed variables” (Council of Economic Advisers 1999, p. 12).  A time
trend is not used in the South Carolina–Mississippi models for two reasons.  First,
the location effects in the models should reflect the cross-sectional county social
and demographic characteristics that may be omitted.  Second, these county char-
acteristics are unlikely to change rapidly over the period of this analysis.  Under
these circumstances, including a time trend (whether quadratic or linear) will add
little control for omitted local characteristics and could reduce the information
content in the remaining regressors.  A second change from the CEA model re-
volves around the choice of using a fixed effects (like the CEA model) or a ran-
dom effects approach to the panel data regressions.  This is, in part, a matter of
testing for the appropriate model (Greene 2000, pp. 576–577).  The Hausman test
for orthogonality between the random effects and the regressors is used to limit
regressors to those that are consistent with the theoretical expectations from the
caseload literature and that do not violate the assumption that the individual ef-
fects are not correlated with the regressors in the model.  As noted below, the
Hausman test was sensitive to the regressors included (most notably in the Mis-
sissippi welfare panel data) but generally supported the use of the random effects
model for the panel data.  The use of cross-sectional dummies for region effects
also makes the random effects approach to the panel data estimations attractive.
Estimating fixed-effects models was problematic because of the collinearity be-
tween cross-section dummies and the region dummies.  Finally, the discussion in
Wallace and Blank (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999) concerning the merits of
the CEA model identified several econometric issues that were taken into account
when developing our model.  First, the random effects models address the use of
first differences as opposed to levels.  In Parks (1967), the time-series data were
transformed using a first-order autoregressive parameter estimated for each coun-
ty.  In Fuller and Battese (1974), data are transformed using constants derived
from the estimators for each of the variance components.  Assuming the error
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terms are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated, Parks also employs
a GLS procedure to adjust for each potential problem.  In sum, the estimation
strategy for the SCM model is a two-step process.  First, use the Hausman test for
the random effects assumption that the error term effects are uncorrelated with the
other variables in the model.  Second, both the Fuller and Battese (1974) and the
Parks (1967) GLS models are estimated to gauge the sensitivity of results to al-
ternative assumptions about the error term.
27. “The 1989 classification system of nonmetro counties, known as the ERS typolo-
gy, is designed to provide policy-relevant information about diverse rural condi-
tions to policymakers, public officials, and researchers.  The classification is
based on 2,276 U.S. counties (including those in Alaska and Hawaii) designated
as nonmetro as of 1993.  The typology includes six mutually exclusive economic
types:  five types (farming, mining, manufacturing, government, and services) re-
flect dependence on particular economic specializations; a sixth type, termed non-
specialized, contains those counties not classified as having any of the five eco-
nomic specializations” (Cook and Mizer 1994, p. 4).
Chapter 4 141
APPENDIX
Data sources for the South Carolina caseloads are from reports
PC100R03, PC100R17, MR410, and MR420, Division of Information Ser-
vices, South Carolina Department of Social Services.  Mississippi
AFDC/TANF and food stamp administrative data are from the Division of
Economic Assistance, Mississippi Department of Human Services.  Data for
the county employment, labor force, and unemployment rates by month are
from the Employment Security Commissions of South Carolina and Mississip-
pi.  County identifiers are from the Beale code, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (Ghelfi and Parker 1997).  Earned Income Tax Credit and minimum wage
data are from Council of Economic Advisers (1999).
A WELFARE CASELOADS REGRESSION MODEL
One econometric specification developed by the Council of Economic
Advisers (1999) forms the foundation for the regression model in Equation 1
used to test for region effects on caseload change.24 Discussions of the merits
of the CEA model in Wallace and Blank (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999)
are used to address estimation issues.  
(1) ln Rct =  B0 + ln EITCBEITC + ln WAGETOBENctBwb + TANFctBtanf
+ UNEMPLOYMENTctBu + TANF×UNEMPLOYMENTctBtu + EGROWBeg
+ TANF×EGROWBteg + REGIONBreg + γc γt + εct
where 
the dependent variable is caseload participation rates,
ln Rct = log of the ratio of caseloads to the labor force in county c for
month t,
γc = county effects (modeled as an error components term),
γt = month effects (modeled as an error components term),25 and
εct = random error.
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Explanatory Variables
Opportunity cost regressors
ln EITC = log of the average of the maximum earned income tax credit for tax-
payers with one child and with more than one child for each year 1990 to 1999
ln WAGETOBEN = log of the ratio of the value of state minimum wage as a
monthly amount (30 hours of work per week for 4.33 weeks) to the maximum
monthly benefit for a family of three on AFDC/TANF
TANF and the economy regressors
TANF = dummy variable = 1 for year and month TANF was in effect for a coun-
ty; otherwise 0
UNEMPLOYMENT = county unemployment rate (lagged two years to ameliorate
endogeneity with current labor force)
TANF×UNEMPLOYMENT = interaction effect between unemployment rate lagged
two years and TANF
EGROW = employment growth rate in the county (most recent quarter and four-
quarter lag)
TANF×EGROW = interaction effect between lagged employment growth rates and
TANF
Region effects used to examine rural/urban 
differences in caseload change.
Three regressions are estimated to reflect three alternative ways to define
“rurality” using alternative dummy variables representing location effects.
Group 1 (Rural disadvantage)
Regional group 1 identifies counties as either metropolitan or nonmetro-
politan.
NONMET = dummy variable = 1 for all nonmetropolitan counties and 0 for other
counties
Group 2 (Remote rural disadvantage)
Group 2 is the set of nonmetropolitan counties divided into those that are
adjacent to a metro county and those that are not.  Welfare participants in
counties more distant from urban job centers may have less access to work op-
portunities than welfare participants in counties near urban counties.
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ADJ = dummy variable = 1 nonmet counties adjacent to metro counties and 0
for other counties
NONADJ = dummy variable =1 for nonmet counties not adjacent to metro and 0
for other counties
Group 3 (Rural industry mix effect)
Group 3 divides the nonmetro counties into one of four economic base
groups: farm, manufacturing, government, or other (services and nonspecial-
ized), from Ghelfi and Parker (1997).  Positive parameters on these dummy
variables would indicate that counties in these classes are less likely to reduce
welfare participation rates than are urban counties, given the same vitality of
the local economy, opportunity cost of not working, and policy regime.  This is
a way to control for “industry mix” effects on welfare participation that Bartik
and Eberts (1999) found to be useful in explaining changes in welfare case-
loads.  In addition, each state was divided into functional economic regions
(BEA Component Economic Areas developed in Johnson 1995).  These re-
gions have an urban core and rural hinterland that are connected by substantial
within-region commuting.  Regions with a booming urban core that offer jobs
to residents of proximate rural areas are expected to have more success in re-
ducing rural caseloads than other regions.  Including BEA region dummies
also provides some control for the type of urban center—government-domi-
nated urban areas such as Columbia, South Carolina, and Jackson, Mississip-
pi; manufacturing-dominated regions like the Greenville-Spartanburg metro
center along the I-85 growth corridor from Charlotte to Atlanta; and resort-
tourism service-oriented urban areas such as Charleston, South Carolina, and
the Mississippi Gulf Coast.26
FRM = dummy variable = 1 for farm dependent rural counties.  Farming con-
tributed a weighted annual average of 20 percent or more labor and proprietor
income from 1987–1989.27
MFG = dummy variable for manufacturing dependent rural counties and 0 for
other counties; manufacturing contributed a weighted annual average of 30
percent or more labor and proprietor income from 1987–1989.
GOV = dummy variable for government dependent rural counties and 0 for oth-
er counties; government activities contributed a weighted annual average of 25
percent or more labor and proprietor income from 1987–1989.
OTH = dummy variable for rural counties not dependent on farming, manu-
facturing, or government and 0 for other counties.  These counties were either
services-dependent (service activities contributed weighted annual average of
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50 percent or more labor and proprietor income from 1987–1989) or nonspe-
cialized (counties not classified as a specialized economic type from 1987–
1989).
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